We investigate the effect of financial development on the formation of European corporate groups. Because cross-country regressions are hard to interpret in a causal sense, we exploit exogenous industry measures to investigate a specific channel through which financial development may affect group affiliation: internal capital markets. Using a comprehensive firm-level data set on European corporate groups in 15 countries, we find that countries with less developed financial markets have a higher percentage of group affiliates in more capitalintensive industries. This relationship is more pronounced for young and small firms and for affiliates of large and diversified groups. Our findings are consistent with the view that internal capital markets may, under some conditions, be more efficient than prevailing external markets, and that this may drive group affiliation even in developed economies.
Introduction
This study seeks to deepen our understanding of …rms' organization and boundaries by examining how regional institutional di¤erences a¤ect the propensity of …rms to form groups within 15 Western European countries. We focus on one speci…c channel through which incentives to band together may operate: internal capital markets ("ICM"). 1 In our setting, federations of …rms (for example the German konzern) are usually referred to as corporate groups (Faccio, et al., 2009) . We test and quantify the e¤ect of ICM on group formation by ranking industries according to their level of external capital needs while also ranking countries according to their relative levels of …nancial development.
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University (sharon.belenzon@duke.edu) y Columbia University, Graduate School of Business (tb2122@columbia.edu) z Fuqua School of Business, Duke University (luis.rios@duke.edu) 1 Section 2 relates our work to prior studies on groups and ICM (e.g. Khanna Our empirical test is thus whether within-country di¤erences in the probability of corporate group a¢ liation across industries are conditioned by the interaction between a …rm's industry's dependence on external capital and its country's relative level of …nancial development.
The formation of groups is often viewed as an intermediating organizational response to missing or ine¢ cient markets (Le¤ 1978) . This is an appealing argument with important strategy and policy implications, but its examination poses three signi…cant empirical challenges. First, while it predicts that group formation should be driven by market development, groups themselves may actually restrain the development of the institutions they mimic (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) . Thus, groups which may have arisen for reasons other than a response to ine¢ cient markets may go on to hamper subsequent …nancial development by limiting arms-length transactions. Second, omitted or latent macro variables can be correlated with both …nancial development and the prevalence of groups. Third, group a¢ liates are often privately-held corporations under intricate ownership arrangements, rendering many groups "relatively invisible" (Granovetter, 1995) . This is particularly likely in the face of regulatory pressure to be discrete about the internal reallocation of resources, which may be perceived as detrimental to minority shareholders (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) or even anti-competitive. 2 This paper is the …rst to tackle all three of these challenges. First, we mitigate the reverse causality concern by focusing on internal capital markets. If groups replace ine¢ cient …nancial markets, we would expect (i) a higher probability of group a¢ liation within capital-intensive industries, where a¢ liates are more likely to bene…t from a group's ICM, and (ii) this relationship to be stronger in countries with less-developed …nancial institutions. A pure reverse causality argument is unlikely to explain the interaction e¤ect between these two since a country's …nancial development is constant across industries, and it is not likely to account for within-country systematic di¤erences in group a¢ liation between high and low demand industries. We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy to determine whether the di¤erence in group a¢ liation between higher and lower external dependence industries is more stark for countries with lower …nancial development. Second, we develop a comprehensive dataset on group a¢ liation and …nancial information covering over 139 thousand (mostly private) European …rms. Our estimation strategy allows us to substantially mitigate unobserved industry and country heterogeneity in addition to controlling for both country and industry …xed e¤ects, by performing a more re…ned test of our theory that variation in the relationship between external dependence and …nancial development among our sample …rms is consistent with the ICM theory.
Third, to mitigate the invisibility problem, we construct detailed ownership and control hierarchies for groups by exploiting the strict reporting requirements of the EU, where both public and private …rms have to …le annual reports detailing ownership and …nancial information. Because ICM transactions themselves are hard to observe, we employ an indirect approach (e.g. Dahl, et al., 2002) to capture the impact of ICM. We identify conditions where internal capital should be more bene…cial and systematically test whether these conditions are associated with higher propensity for …rms to be organized in groups. One advantage of our indirect approach is that it relies on the revealed preferences of …rms, rather than on reporting which may be polluted by …rms'self-serving interests.
We follow the methodology employed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to rank industries according to their dependence on external sources of funding, taking into consideration external funds dependence, external equity dependence, and trade credit. Then we rank the 15 West-European countries in our sample according to their level of …nancial development using world-bank indices which consider the stock market and banking systems for each country (Beck, et al., 2007) . Though our focal countries are relatively wealthy and enjoy developed legal environments, they nonetheless exhibit measurably di¤erent levels of …nancial institution development according to these …ne-grained indices. To supplement the accounting measures of …nancial development, we also use measures from the World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey, [2006] [2007] (Claessens and Laeven 2003) , which capture local access to equity and loan markets.
Our …ndings strongly support the ICM hypothesis. We …nd that high-dependence industries have disproportionately more group a¢ liated …rms than low-dependence industries, and that this di¤erence declines as …nancial development increases. This result suggests that less-developed markets disproportionately foster the formation of corporate groups in sectors where internal capital markets are especially bene…cial. Consistent with the view that small and young …rms are likely to face higher costs for outside capital (Gompers 1995) , our results also show that the e¤ect of …nancial development on group a¢ liation is more signi…cant for smaller and younger …rms. Our results are also strong for …rms a¢ liated with larger and more diversi…ed groups, where ICM are likely to be more substantial.
2 Corporate groups and internal capital markets 2.1 What are European Corporate Groups?
Our paper focuses on a set of West European economies which: i) share a clear and consistent de…nition of groups based on historical, institutional, and economical traditions; ii) exist within a narrow enough range of economic development, so that we do not commingle developing and developed economies; 3 and iii) have enough variation in their …nancial development and industries, so that we may observe the impact of a meaningful interaction between industry capital demand and country economic development.
Group de…nition is important in our study because there are many incongruous conceptualizations of what a group is. Since Le¤'s seminal work (1978), scholars have found many di¤erent examples of "…rms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways, characterized by an 'intermediate' level of binding" (Granovetter, 1995, page 95). Mostly within the context of emerging economies, the business group literature has emphasized features such as concentrated ownership, reciprocal trading arrangements, and familial control, Rivkin, 2001, 2006; Kester, 1992) . Concurrently, the "pyramidal groups" literature has focused mainly on formal ownership structure and the often darker sides of group organization within developed economies (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Morck, 2005) .
We do not take a position on whether these streams speak of the same phenomena, and we do not claim that our empirical sample overlaps directly with any of these types of groups. Rather, we rely on the ownership-based EU de…nition of groups to ensure the consistency of criteria needed for our empirical strategy. The concept of corporate groups within a Western European context is codi…ed in legal, cultural and economic institutions, and this reduces our dependency on theory for assumptions about boundary conditions for group membership. 3 Thus, our concern in this paper is not so much with showing whether groups exist in Europe, as it is to explore whether the heterogeneity in their prevalence across countries and industries provides evidence of an ICM mechanism behind their formation.
Though prior work has found ownership links to be tepid determinants of group membership in emerging markets (Khanna and Rivkin, 2006) , there are strong reasons to believe that they reliably demarcate group membership in our setting. In the EU, courts and government agencies speci…cally emphasize the concept of control as a condition for group a¢ liation. This refers to the direct and indirect ownership stakes the controlling shareholder has in each of the corporate group a¢ liates (Windbichler, 2000) . Additionally, the notion of corporate groups is part of the economic environment in the EU. For example, Figure 1 shows the ownership structure of a representative group, Berge y Cia., which describes itself as "one of the major Spanish corporate groups." 4 Similarly, a vast number of …rms in our sample incorporate group membership into their corporate identity, by including the 3 Direct references to corporate groups are found throughout the EU governing documents, for example the Fourth Directive of the Council of European Communities (1978), where accounting reporting regulations for groups are stipulated: "Whereas, when a company belongs to a group, it is desirable that group accounts giving a true and fair view of the activities of the group as a whole be published." 4 
, we classify a …rm as a group a¢ liate if it satis…es at least one these three criteria: i) the …rm is a subsidiary (that is, it has a controlling parent company), ii) it controls another …rm; iii) it has the same controlling shareholder as at least one other …rm.
It is important to note that we do not attempt to capture every single …rm or group within our region of study. However, for our empirical strategy to work, it is paramount that our sampling is representative of the distribution of industries within a given country, along the dimensions of external dependence and country …nancial development, and that it is not biased by …rms that are missing ownership or …nancial information. For this reason, we exclude very small …rms from our main estimation sample, whose ownership and …nancial data is not consistent across countries. Section 3 details our speci…c data construction and method for characterizing …rms as group a¢ liates, including a detailed discussion of our mitigation of potential bias issues. We perform a battery of tests to ensure that our results are robust to alternate sample inclusion criteria.
Our focused empirical approach may limit the generalizability of our study, since groups (in the broader context) are heterogeneous across time and place (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001) . Nonetheless, because our study focuses on how relative market e¢ ciency drives the partial internalization of transactions within groups, our …ndings should be relevant in other settings where "the group is an integral part of the resource allocation mechanism," (Goto, 1982, p. 60 (Deloof, 1998) .
Within the relatively developed countries in our study, we would expect ICM to work through subtle mechanisms like the direct funding of a¢ liates using cash ‡ow from other a¢ liates with less attractive investment opportunities, or the leveraging of group reputation and assets as guarantees for the capital raising e¤orts of a¢ liates. Often, a corporate group may have …nancing subsidiaries in various markets, which are able to raise capital on favorable terms as a result of guarantees provided by the controlling …rm. For example, Novartis'subsidiaries regularly issue debt that is guaranteed by the parent, such as a $2bn issue by Novartis Capital Corp., the $3bn issued by the group's Bermuda unit, Novartis Securities Investment, and the EUR 1.5bn issued by Novartis Finance (Luxemburg). In all three cases, the debt was guaranteed by the parent, and accompanied by statements which obliquely acknowledged the ICM nature of these transactions, such as: "proceeds will be used for intercompany re…nancing purposes in connection with the pending Alcon acquisition, as well as for general corporate purposes."
Our central question is whether the ICM that have been observed re ‡ect bene…cial side e¤ects of groups (which may form for a variety of reasons) or whether the bene…ts of ICM themselves foster group formation. To properly address this, we systematically document the distributions of groups across industries and countries. Quite simply, we look for groups to be more prevalent wherever ICM would be more valuable.
Methods

Empirical strategy
We study the e¤ect of …nancial development on group a¢ liation by testing whether corporate groups substitute for less developed …nancial institutions. Here, reverse causality between group formation and …nancial development poses a serious identi…cation challenge. This is because we might expect lower overall incentives for …nancial markets to improve in regions where groups already facilitate …nancing. Thus, groups may actually hamper …nancial development, rather than be a response to lower development. An additional issue is that simply examining …rm-speci…c proxy for external …nancial dependence would measure external funding set in equilibrium rather than the demand for external funding, and thus su¤er from endogeneity problems. The use of aggregate and exogenous industry variation should be especially advantageous in this setting.
To deal with these issues, we analyze a key channel through which …nancial development a¤ects group a¢ liation: internal capital markets. If groups form as a substitute for underdeveloped …nancial markets, we should observe a higher probability of group a¢ liation for …rms with a higher external …nancing needs, since they would bene…t more from access to internal capital markets. This should be more pronounced in countries with relatively low …nancial development since these countries have more limited alternatives to raising capital. We follow the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and rank industries according to the extent that they rely on external funds by looking at U.S. …rms.
The logic behind this strategy is this: (i) The U.S. is the most advanced capital markets in the world, where publicly-traded …rms face the least friction in accessing …nance. Thus, the amount of external …nance used by these companies is a good measure of their industry's demand for external …nance. (ii)
Disclosure requirements result in comprehensive data on funding sources. (iii) U.S. industry data is exogenous to European …rms, but major industries are structurally similar, so an industry's dependence on external funds in the U.S. is likely to be a good measure of that industry's dependence on external funds in our setting; (iv) groups are less common in the U.S., so U.S. …rms'demand for external funds is a good proxy for demand in the absence of options for group ICM's.
Two main assumptions are needed for our identi…cation strategy to work: that technological di¤erences explain why some industries rely on external funds more than others, and that these di¤erences persist across countries. Figure 2 shows the logic behind our empirical strategy. We can readily see that nations with lower scores in terms of stock market development also have considerably larger shares of group-a¢ liated …rms in industries with high external capital dependence. We de…ne the measures used in the next section. Though in our regressions we introduce a number of controls to better understand these relationships, this non-parametric pattern is prima facie consistent with the hypothesis that groups provide an alternative source of capital within less developed …nancial markets.
Data
Our dataset relies on detailed ownership links and accounting information from the 2007 version of Amadeus, a comprehensive European database by Bureau van Dijk (BVSD), which covers both private and public …rms. BVD has developed a format that standardizes …nancial items across the various countries' …ling regulations, balanced with a realistic representation of European company accounts.
A key advantage of these data is that by including private as well public …rms, we capture a wide range of …rm sizes. In this paper we mostly exploit cross-sectional variation, across …rms, industries, and countries. Because Amadeus includes information for industrial …rms only, we add information for …nancial institutions from BankScope, which provides ownership information for about ten thousand banks. The …nal estimation sample includes 139,254 …rms, 50.6% of which are a¢ liated with 26,711 groups. 6
Sample construction
In this section, we explain our three-step methodology for constructing the data and describe our sample. We …rst identify which of the dyadic inter-…rm ownership links reported in Amadeus or BankScope represent a controlling interest. Then we use this information to map hierarchies of ownership and infer group structure. Finally, we reclassify or drop some …rms and groups according to a set of re…ning criteria.
Ownership links. To ensure that the ownership links we observe represent actual control, they must include a minimum share of voting rights. For private …rms, a link is considered controlling if it has at least 50% of the voting rights. For public …rms, which typically have a more dispersed ownership, the threshold is set at 20%, consistent with previous literature on public …rms (e.g. La Porta et al.
1999, Faccio and Lang 2001
). Our results are not sensitive to di¤erent plausible speci…cations of these thresholds. It is important to note that links between …rms need not be direct. For example, if …rm A owns 50% of …rm B, and …rm B owns 50% of …rm C, then …rm A has a 25% ownership link to C.
Corporate group de…nition. We de…ne a corporate group as a set of at least two legally distinct …rms where one of them is a controlling ultimate owner according to the ownership links identi…ed above. Speci…cally, this means that for a …rm to be a group a¢ liate, it must meet at least one of these criteria: i) the …rm is a subsidiary (that is, it has a controlling parent company), ii) it controls another corporation; iii) it has the same controlling shareholder as at least one other corporation.
Estimation sample selection. We impose two additional conditions before …nalizing our baseline estimation sample. First, banks are excluded, as they are likely to face di¤erent considerations when joining groups (the a¢ liation decisions of …nancial institutions are beyond the scope of this paper).
Second, countries in our sample di¤er in their reporting requirements for small …rms, because countries have di¤erent mandatory …lling requirements for them. Thus, many small …rms simply do not …le reports in some countries. There is, however, no reason to suspect within-country systematic variation in reporting patterns across industries. Since our empirical approach investigates the interaction between industry and country measures, while controlling for country and industry level e¤ects, our results are not sensitive to cross-country variation in reporting patterns. Nonetheless, we mitigate the potential bias of voluntary disclosure by eliminating all …rms that generate less than $10mm in annual sales. This is a conservative threshold based on our research on BVD's data collection processes, which included multiple interview with their experts and top executives. We perform a number of robustness checks to ensure that our size thresholds do not introduce sample bias.
Industry external dependence
In order to thoroughly explore the interactions between …nancial development and external dependence, we use multiple measures of each, and interact them in multiple combinations. For external dependence we use three distinct measures. External funds dependence is calculated by dividing the cost of capital expenditures, in excess of cash ‡ows from operations, over the total cost of capital expenditures. This captures the fraction of the …rm's investment that are not …nanced using internal cash ‡ows. We also follow Nilsen (2002) and Fisman and Love (2003) and focus on suppliers' provision of funds-trade credits. We construct trade credits as the ratio between accounts payable and total assets. Finally, we take into account investment intensity, computed as capital expenditures over total assets. All measures are calculated using American Compustat …rms from 1980 to 2000 at the three-digit SIC level (163 industries).
Financial development
We use four accounting measures and four survey measures of …nancial development. Our use of the word "development" in this context is consistent with much extant work. Nonetheless, some scholars may consider the di¤erences we measure as capturing di¤erent "types" of development, eschewing the ordinal connotations implied by terms such as "level of development" (Carlin and Mayer, 2003) . Thus, 9
we are careful to point out that whether a country's level of development along any measure is higher or lower merely re ‡ects whether a channel is more or less conducive to industrial …rms'access to external capital. 7 To 7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
10 …rms belong to 26,672 unique groups with 12 a¢ liates on average. Groups in our sample have abundant resources: the average group holds around $6.5 billion in assets, however this seems to be driven by groups at the highest end of the distribution, since the mean is $52 million, and the 90th percentile is $1 billion. 
Econometric speci…cation
We estimate a Linear Probability Model for the likelihood that a …rm is a¢ liated with a group. The econometric speci…cation is:
i denotes …rms -the unit of observation, Sales i is annual sales of …rm, F inDev c is the …nancial development measure for country c, ExtDep j is a measure of external dependence for industry j, ' j and c are complete sets of industry and country dummies, and i is an iid error term. Similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) , we control for the share of industry sales in each country. Sales share jc is the share of total sales of industry j (in which the focal …rm operates) in country c: This measure is computed using all …rms in the complete sample where we make no restrictions on sales volume.
Consistent with the hypothesis that the di¤erence in share of a¢ liated …rms between high and low external dependence industries would be larger in countries with lower …nancial development, we expect b 2 < 0: The interpretation of b 2 can be easily explained in terms of di¤erence-in-di¤erence. Taking the …rst di¤erence in probability of a¢ liation with respect to external dependence, holding country …nancial development …xed, yields P c = b 2 F inDev c ExtDep. Next taking the di¤erence in P c between high and low country …nancial development yields P = b 2 F inDev ExtDep. Therefore, b 2 measures how much higher the likelihood of a¢ liation is at high level of external dependence with respect to an industry at low dependence level when the …rm is located in a country with a high level of …nancial development rather than in a country with low level of development. In the tables that present the estimation results we refer to P as the di¤ erential in a¢ liation probability. This is our main metric of quanti…cation. In our regressions, di¤erential in a¢ liation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of a¢ liation is at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with respect to an industry at the 10th percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level of …nancial development rather than in one with the lowest level of …nancial development. Table 4 reports the baseline estimation results for the interaction between …nancial development, using the World Bank accounting measures of stock market and banking system, and industry external dependence. The pattern of results is consistent with our hypothesis: the coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction terms between industry external dependence and country …nancial development ( b 2 )
Estimation results
Baseline estimation
is negative and highly signi…cant for the various combinations of dependence and development. In unreported results we …nd that a similar probit speci…cation yields consistently similar …ndings. Table   5 presents the estimation results using the survey measures. For each speci…cation we calculate and report the di¤ erential in a¢ liation probability ( P ):
The estimated e¤ect of …nancial development on group a¢ liation varies for di¤erent development measures, ranging from a -11.9 percent for stock market capitalization to -2.6 percent for bank deposits.
However, most measures have an e¤ect between -5 and -8 percent, compared to a sample mean of a¢ liation of 50.5. Table 5 …nds similar, though somewhat smaller estimates for the survey-based measures of …nancial development. We suspect that the survey measure may be noisier than the direct measures, resulting in some attenuation bias.
An important concern is that industry specialization may be systematically related to country …nancial development. For example, countries may specialize in certain industries as a response to the level of …nancial development. If this were the case we would expect economic production to be heavily concentrated in speci…c industries. We check the sensitivity of our results to such potential industry specialization by excluding industries with country sales share of above 2.5 percent -the 75th percentile of the industry sales share distribution. The results are not sensitive to dropping dominant industries. For instance, estimating speci…cation 1 of Table 4 yields as coe¢ cient estimate of -0.023 (a standard error of 0.004) on the interaction term between stock market value and external funds dependence.
Our results are also robust to excluding very large …rms using various di¤erent size thresholds.
Estimating speci…cation 1 in Table 4 using the sample where we remove …rms with more than $100mm in annual sales yields even stronger results compared to the baseline sample where we do not restrict the sample of maximal sales. Under these conditions, the coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between stock market value and external funds dependence is -0.023 (a standard error of 0.004). The next section further investigates how our results vary by …rm size.
Firm age and size
We next explore whether the variation in country-industry interactions for di¤erent …rm and group subsamples is consistent with the ICM theory. We focus on two fundamental …rm characteristics: size and age. Stock market development is likely to play an important role in …nancing smaller and private …rms for three main reasons. The …rst is direct …nancing, since smaller …rms with insu¢ cient collateral often have a hard time raising debt money via secured …nancing. 8 The second reason is that stock market development increases private equity, venture capital funds, and angels, as these investors'exits rely on IPOs and divestitures, which are both positively correlated with stock market activity (Black and Gilson, 1998; Celikyurt, & Sevilir, 2010) . The third reason is through competition e¤ects. In countries with less-developed equity or debt public markets, small and young …rms have to compete for capital with more established …rms. Assuming that the supply of capital is limited, as clearly demonstrated during the 2008 …nancial crisis, raising capital would be harder for small and young …rms in less-developed …nancial markets.
Small and young …rms should have on average more to gain by accessing a group's ICM under conditions of lower external …nancial development. Small …rms typically do not have substantial internal resources, thus that are more likely to rely on outside capital to …nance their operations and compete in the market place (Ernst, 1998). Young …rms face the "liability of newness" (Freeman, et al., 1983) and are typically more dependent on external …nancing than older …rms (Levinthal, 1991 ; Rajan and Zingales 1998). Firm age is commonly associated with higher levels of asymmetric information between the …rm and outsiders, such as lenders (Ritter 1984, Oliner and Rudebusch 1992).
Thus, the ICM theory predicts that the country-industry interactions would be particularly strong when comparing small standalone …rms to small a¢ liated …rms, compared to when comparing large standalone …rms to large a¢ liated …rms. The same reasoning applies to the respective comparison by 8 The London Stock Exchange Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is one example of how stock markets provide direct …nancing for small …rms. It allows small …rms (average market capitalization of $65mm relative to $1.1bn in the NASDAQ) to raise equity …nancing in the stock market. More than 3,000 …rms have raised …nancing through the AIM. Between 1995 and 2008 this amounted to 64.4 billion GBP, and averaged 21.6 million GBP per …rm. The importance of AIM for small …rm …nancing was especially clear during the 2008-2009 global …nancial crisis, as 138 …rms were still able to raise 8.5 billion GBP. 13 …rm age.
The results are consistent with these conjectures. Table 5 presents the estimation results for breaking the sample by quartiles of …rm sales and quartiles of …rm age. In columns 1 and 2 we see a large and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the interaction between industry dependence and country development for small and medium …rms (…rst quartile of sales, with average sales of $12.6mm and second to third quartiles, with average sales of $31.4mm). The di¤erential e¤ect for small …rms is -6.9
and for medium-size …rms it is -8.9 percent. In sharp contrast, the interaction e¤ect is e¤ectively zero for large …rms (fourth quartile of sales; average annual sales of $616mm).
The large …rm sample includes very large …rms, which are almost always a¢ liated with a group. In unreported speci…cations we examine whether the lack of results for the large …rm sample is driven by outliers by dropping all …rms that generate more than $100mm in annual sales. This exclusion reduces average sales for the large …rms from $616mm to $80.3mm. The industry-country interaction remains insigni…cant (a coe¢ cient estimate of -0.010 and a standard error of 0.011). Thus, we conclude the lack of signi…cant results for large …rms is not driven by the presence of very large …rms in this subsample.
In columns 4-6 we report very similar …ndings for …rm age. For young and middle-age …rms the coe¢ cient estimate on industry-country interaction is large and is highly signi…cant; however, it is completely muted for mature …rms.
Group size and industry diversi…cation
We next examine how our results vary by di¤erent group characteristics. We focus on group size and industry diversi…cation as measures of the potential internal resources available to a¢ liates. Intuitively, larger size can be associated with more resources, while diversi…cation is less straightforward.
Diversi…cation is likely to be positively associated with a more active ICM because a group with af-…liates in diverse industries is more likely to have a mix of low capital-intensive a¢ liates from which to appropriate (supply) and high capital-intensive a¢ liates with better investment opportunities (demand). Of course, from a purely risk-sharing perspective, groups with homogenous a¢ liates would still provide ICM bene…ts as long as any external shocks a¤ect some but not all a¢ liates. Nonetheless, redistributive bene…ts should accrue especially to diversi…ed groups.
Group size and diversi…cation are often related, with larger groups more likely to be more diversi…ed.
Thus, as with the size/age e¤ects we discussed in the prior section, we do not fully disentangle the role of large groups vs. the role of diversi…ed groups. Nonetheless, we expect both large and diversi…ed groups to be attractive to potential a¢ liates in high dependency industries, so these e¤ects should move in the same direction. Columns 7-9 in Table 6 break the sample to separately compare standalone …rms to a¢ liates of small, medium and large groups (based on total group assets quartiles, with Q2 and Q3 considered "medium). The pattern of results is consistent with the ICM theory. The industry-country interaction is zero when comparing standalone …rms to a¢ liates of small groups, but it is large for a¢ liates of medium and large groups (a coe¢ cient estimate of -0.016 and a standard error of 0.005, for both group categories, with di¤erential e¤ect of -5.3%).
We …nd the same pattern of results in Columns 10-12, where we split the sample by group industry diversi…cation. For specialized groups (where all group sales are within a single three-digit SIC code), the coe¢ cient estimate on the industry-country interaction is insigni…cant, but for medium and highly diversi…ed groups the interaction is large and signi…cant (di¤erential e¤ects of -5.6% and -5.3%, respectively).
There is evidence that banks play an important role in ICM dynamics. 272 of our groups (which together have 3,105 a¢ liates) include a bank. We examine the distribution of these banks by group size and industry diversi…cation. 58 percent of the banks belong to groups in the highest size (assets) quartile, while only 5 percent of the banks belong small groups in the lowest quartile. A less extreme pattern holds when examining bank distribution by group diversi…cation, with 42 percent of banks belonging to groups in the top quartile of diversi…cation. These patterns would be consistent with the view that the observed patterns of a¢ liation to large groups may also be related to the presence of banks in these groups. Evidence that the industry-country interaction estimates are driven by groups with speci…c types of …nancial institutions would strengthen our argument of ICM. It would also provide more clarity on the mechanism through which the group ICM is accessed by a¢ liated …rms.
However, such …ne-grained analysis is beyond the scope of our paper. Future work should focus on not just banks, but also other types of cash-cow …rms such as life insurance and utility companies, which may be prevalent in large corporate groups, and may provide steady sources of capital to a¢ liates. Table 7 presents estimation results for several robustness tests. First, we include the linear e¤ect of external dependence, by not controlling for industry …xed e¤ects. As expected, the interaction e¤ect between external dependence and development remains negative and signi…cant and the level e¤ect is positive and signi…cant. Then we explore whether the e¤ect of countries' …nancial development on a¢ liation may vary non-linearly across industries'external dependence by splitting industries into quartiles of external dependence and interacting each quartile dummy separately with our external dependence measure (Table 7 , column 2). We …nd negative and signi…cant interaction coe¢ cients for Q2 to Q4 (relative to the baseline, Q1). However the coe¢ cient for the highest quartile of external dependence is almost twice that for the second and third quartiles.
Robustness checks
When we exclude acquired …rms that have been with the group less than …ve years (Column 3), we …nd the coe¢ cient for the …nancial development and industry dependence interaction to be moderately larger than the baseline. This would be consistent with a view where long-term ties are more conducive to ICM.
In columns 4-7 we investigate the robustness of our results to di¤erent samples of Compustat …rms.
Listed U.S. …rms tend to be large and operate in more than one industry. Thus, measuring industries' external dependence using diversi…ed …rms may be noisy. We use Compustat line-of-business data to characterize the extent to which …rms operate in more than one three-digit industry code. The results remain robust for including only specialized …rms (Column 4). In Columns 5 and 6 we calculate the external dependence measures based on …rms with below and above median years since IPO. The results remain similar for both …rm samples.
In our main speci…cations, we restrict our sample to …rms that have at least $10 million in sales. This is to ensure that we concentrate on …rms that are unlikely to shirk on their reporting responsibilities.
However, we also check our results by including all …rms regardless of sales volume (increasing the sample to over 815 thousand …rms). As shown in Column 7, the same pattern of results continue to hold. Actually, the coe¢ cient estimate on the industry-country interaction and respective di¤erential e¤ect are larger in the unrestricted sample, as compared to baseline estimation sample (where …rms are required to have at least $10mm in annual sales). In Column 8 we restrict the sample to …rms that generate at least $1mm in annual sales. The results continue to hold.
Lastly, Column 9 addresses a di¤erent selection concern: the availability of ownership information.
Our baseline sample excludes …rms with no ownership information. These …rms are likely to be standalones, as ownership coverage tends to be much better for …rms that are a¢ liated with groups, even when the …rms themselves are small. If the availability of ownership information systematically varies by industry external dependence and country …nancial development, our results may be biased.
To check whether our results are sensitive to missing ownership information, we add to our baseline sample also …rms with no ownership information, which we classify as standalones. As shown in Column 9, there is no substantial change in the estimated coe¢ cient on the industry-country interaction.
This strongly suggests that ownership information does not systematically vary along the external dependence and …nancial development dimensions. We repeat the same procedure for an unrestricted sample (not reported in the table). We include all …rms in the Amadeus database with non-missing ownership information, totalling 1.9 million …rms (of which 8.4 percent are group a¢ liated). We estimate the same speci…cation as in Column 9 using this very large sample and …nd the same coe¢ cient estimate (-0.018 and a standard error of 0.002).
In unreported estimations, we address the concern that our …ndings are driven by speci…c countries.
Using our baseline speci…cation, we systematically remove each country in our sample (one at a time) and …nd that overall no single country drives our results. The coe¢ cients on the interaction between stock market value/GDP and external funds dependence are very consistent, ranging from -0.017 to -0.026. All estimations yield signi…cant and comparable di¤erential e¤ects.
Panel estimation
We estimate a panel speci…cation of the e¤ect of …nancial development on a¢ liation probability in order to control for country-industry e¤ects. As discussed in Section 3.3, the descriptive statistics do not suggest any systematic skewness across countries in the distribution of …rms high and low external dependence. Nonetheless, we employ a panel estimation approach to further ensure that the overall distribution of …rms operating in high and low dependence industries is not systematically correlated with a country's level of …nancial development. Thus here we exploit time variation in country …nancial development.
Our approach investigates whether new …rms are more likely to be established as standalones or a¢ liates when …nancial markets become more developed, especially in industries with high external dependence. Our unbalanced panel from 1980 to 2007 starts with the 2007 ownership structure and use M&A data to determine whether …rms were incorporated as standalones or as a¢ liates. Firms can change their ownership structures either by joining a group or by separating from one, so the M&A history helps us trace back to the structure of the …rm at incorporation.
We make the following assumptions: For …rms that appear as standalones in 2007, we assume that they were incorporated as standalones unless our M&A data indicate the …rm has divested of a¢ liates in the past, in which case it is reclassi…ed as group-incorporated. For …rms that are classi…ed as a¢ liates in 2007, we assume that they were incorporated as a¢ liates of the same group unless we …nd evidence of having joined a group post incorporation.
We use BVD's Zephyr database and SDC Platinum to identify about …ve thousand …rms that joined groups in our sample in 1980-2007. Our econometric speci…cation is:
Where ' jc and t are complete sets of industry country and year of incorporation dummies, Table 8 presents the estimation results. The general pattern of results continues to hold. For …nancial development (stock market value), controlling only for linear industry and country e¤ects, the coe¢ cient on the interaction with external equity is -0.052 and is highly signi…cant (with a standard error of 0.005). Controlling for industry country e¤ects only slightly lowers the coe¢ cient estimate (-0.047), which remains highly signi…cant. We …nd even stronger results for bank credit/GDP. Controlling for industry country e¤ects, this coe¢ cient estimate increases to -0.091, and is highly signi…cant.
These results imply that as …nancial markets improve over time, new …rms are more likely to be established as standalones, rather than as corporate group a¢ liates.
We perform a number of robustness tests on our panel estimation, in line with those reported in the previous section. We …nd that reducing the sales threshold from $10 million to $1 million has a negligible e¤ect (columns 3 and 10). Consistent with our results in section 4.3 we also …nd that most of our …ndings are driven by a¢ liates of large groups (columns 4, 5, 11, 12). However, using the panel estimation, the di¤erence between a¢ liates of specialized and diversi…ed groups is less stark (columns 6, 7, 13, 14) . Nonetheless, the coe¢ cient on diversi…ed groups is still 15% to 20% larger than for specialized groups.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper uses a comprehensive …rm-level database on group a¢ liation in 15 European countries to study the determinants of group a¢ liation. Our results indicate that the interaction between …nancial development and industry demand for external capital a¤ect the formation of corporate groups. We …nd that even in Western European economies, countries with relatively less developed …nancial markets have a disproportionately higher percentage of group a¢ liates in industries with high levels of external dependence. This implies that …rms are more likely to be part of corporate groups to access their internal capital markets.
This paper contributes to the broader literature on groups by providing higher resolution on one piece of this eclectic mosaic: European corporate groups. Our results highlight the role that internal capital markets play in the organization decision of …rms across nations and industries. We thus directly complement and extend previous research on corporate groups, as well as provide empirical evidence for the role of ICM, which may have more general applications in other settings where resource allocation is an important function. An important implication of our study is the …nding that capital may be a valuable resource even within developed nations, to the extent that ICM can be more e¢ cient than the prevailing markets for capital.
There is compelling anecdotal evidence in support to our …ndings. For example, J.P. Morgan (2009) estimates that the portion of total synergies in M&A transactions attributed to …nancial resources (such as decreased cost of capital, tax shields, and …nancial ‡exibility) increased from 21% in 2007 to 40% during the 2008-2009 …nancial crisis, which reduced the level of …nancial development for European countries. Consistent with our results, the increase in …nancial synergies was more pronounced for smaller and less diversi…ed …rms with lower credit ratings.
Our …ndings have several strategic implications. We …nd that in some countries …rms elect to organize into groups despite the many potential costs of group membership, such as governance problems, This study has also implications for M&A strategy. First, it may be relevant to …rms engaged in the valuation of group-a¢ liated targets. If separating a target …rm from its group deprives it of valuable resources, this may in turn impact its future performance. Second, reliance on ICM may lead group a¢ liates to maintain less liquidity and reduce market transparency, thus hampering investment and perpetuating market ine¢ ciencies (Teece, et al., 2000) . Finally, M&A is an important mechanism that leads to group a¢ liation, and this process requires approval by shareholders, who must weigh the pros and cons of remaining independent versus tapping into the resources available to group members.
Several notorious cases, such as the protracted negotiations between VW and Porsche or KLM and
Alitalia, highlight the importance of appeasing both major and minor shareholders who stand in the way of bringing a …rm into a group. Often, stakeholders cannot adequately weigh the trade-o¤s involved in such a transaction, which calls for better understanding of the less tangible dimensions of group membership.
To the extent that costs and bene…ts of group membership may vary by nation within the EU, our results highlight the complexity in …nding the right balance between shareholder protections, anti-trust policy, and incentives to growth. Similarly, there are potential tensions between individual countries'speci…c constraints and collective EU goals. Hence it is possible that, even in a very narrowly de…ned Western European context, no simple answer will arise to the question of whether groups are "paragons" or "parasites" (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) .
At a higher level, our work here relates to that which looks at hybrid organizations. Pure forms of hierarchy and markets are becoming increasingly rare, due to the growth of a "swollen" or "swelling" middle (Hennart, 1993) . As many have noted, the "old" vertically-integrated mode of production is breaking up, and is being replaced by inter-…rm collaboration (Feenstra, 1998 , Gilson et al., 2008 .
Groups may be seen as hybrid forms of organization (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) , and our study may be useful to researchers exploring this type of framework. !" #$" %& '() * #+ ,-. 
Figure 2: Differences in Group Affiliation between Industries with High and Low External Financial Dependence Across Countries
Notes: This figure describes the difference in the percentage of affiliates between the highest and lowest quartiles of external financial dependence across countries. Countries are ranked according to their financial development in ascending order. Financial development is based on Beck et al. (2000 Beck et al. ( , 2007 , and is the average of stock market value traded and stock market capitalization over GDP (averaged over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] . Industry Sales Share is three-digit industry sales as a share of total country sales, computed over all firms in the estimation sample. Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with respect to an industry at the 10the percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level of financial development rather than in one with the lowest level of financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by ultimate owner (for standalone firms the ultimate owner is the firm itself). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. . Industry Sales Share is three-digit industry sales as a share of total country sales, computed over all firms in the estimation sample.Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with respect to an industry at the 10the percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level of financial development rather than in one with the lowest level of financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by ultimate owner (for standalone firms the ultimate owner is the firm itself). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The estimation is cross-sectional (at the firm level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year that data is available. The baseline estimation sample includes firms that have non-missing ownership informations, and annual sale values greater than $10mm. Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with respect to an industry at the 10the percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level of financial development rather than in one with the lowest level of financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by ultimate owner. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) ( Column 8 includes only firms with sales over $1mm. Column 9 adds firms with no ownership information (classified as standalones) to the baseline sample (at least $10mm in sales). Differentials in affiliation probability measure the change in likelihood of affiliation at the 90th percentile level of external dependence with respect to an industry at the 10th percentile level when it is located in a country with the highest level of financial development rather than in one with the lowest level of financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by ultimate owner. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Fixed-effects:
Country
Year Notes: This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions examining the effect of financial development on group affiliation for a panel of firms. We focus on the fraction of newly established firms that are formed as group affiliates. The dependent variable is a group affiliation dummy that equals one for firms that are affiliates to groups and equals zero for standalone firms. The panel is constructed in the following way: We include firms that were incorporated in 1980-2007. We use the 2007 ownership structure to determine whether these firms were incorporated as standalones or as part of a group. 
